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If we profess allegiance to reason, it would be seditious to
adopt so arbitrary and uncertain a concept as viability as a
dividing line between those persons who shall enjoy the
protection of our remedial laws and those who shall
1
become, for most intents and purposes, nonentities.
I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

In December 2006, National Geographic presented a highly
2
acclaimed special on animals in the womb. Through modern
technology, the viewers watched the fascinating development of
†
Roger J. Magnuson is a partner at Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Minneapolis
and head of the firm’s National Strategic Litigation group.
†† Joshua M. Lederman is in his third year of legal studies at Oak Brook
College of Law and Government Policy.
1. Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 754 (R.I. 1976).
2. See In the Womb: Animals (National Geographic Channel television
broadcast Dec. 10, 2006).
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baby elephants, cuddly preborn puppies, and a host of other living
things still in their mothers’ wombs.
As one prominent
commentator pointed out, the show evoked an affective response
by the audience, a seemingly natural sense of wonderment coupled
with a protective instinct toward such vulnerable and remarkable
3
“babies.”
The irony noted by the commentator is that when abortion is
involved, showing ultrasound images of a fetus to a mother is
4
considered manipulative and intimidating. Measures meant to
ensure that mothers considering an abortion view such ultrasound
5
In some cases, these
images have been vigorously opposed.
6
measures have even been struck down by courts. In addition, the
protective instincts evoked by a preborn puppy do not seem to be
matched by a similar concern for the “products of conception” that
is discussed in abortion cases or in the public controversy long
7
swirling around Roe v. Wade.
While this curious, emotional
disconnect in affective reasoning may be of interest to a newspaper
columnist, there appears to be a more serious contradiction
emerging in the law with respect to legal protections given to a
fetus.
In August 2002, an Arkansas district judge placed an unborn
8
child in the custody of the state. The court based its decision on
the fact that the mother of the child was using illegal drugs and
9
had declined to receive any prenatal care. The district judge
found that the interests of the child were of enough importance
and legal significance to warrant placing it in state custody by

3. See Kathleen Parker, The Elephant and the Embryo, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec.
3, 2006, at A23.
4. See id.
5. See American Civil Liberties Union, Burdensome Clinic Regulations, Mar. 6,
1996, http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/abortion/16524res19960301.html
(describing the showing of ultrasound images as “unnecessary” abortion clinic
regulations).
6. See, e.g., Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1109
(M.D. Ala. 2003) (invalidating a law requiring, among other things, a mother
considering an abortion be shown color photographs of the fetus in cases where
live birth was not possible).
7. See, e.g., Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir. 1999)
(describing one method of second-trimester abortion as “remov[ing] the fetus and
other products of conception”).
8. See Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772, 773–74
(Ark. 2003).
9. Id.
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10

detaining the mother. The judge ordered the mother to cease
using illegal drugs and later found her in contempt for failure to
11
follow those instructions. The judge also ordered that prenatal
12
care be initiated.
13
Though later reversed on appeal, the district judge’s decision
reflects a willingness to interfere with the mother’s liberties and to
subordinate her interests to those of her unborn child in a way that
mirrors the premises underlying a developing body of fetal rights
law. That development might be called, using the words of Justice
Blackmun in another context, a surprisingly “preternatural
14
solicitousness” for a “non-person.” In other contexts, courts have
held that the mother has an essentially untrammeled constitutional
right to terminate the life of that fetus without consequence and
15
with the full protection of the law. The Arkansas judge’s ruling
suggests that a mother’s rights are trumped by the interests of her
unborn child in avoiding physical harm, unless of course she
decides to abort it—in which case the interests of the child in life
16
itself are wholly disregarded and the mother’s right is supreme.
While logic may not be the life of the law in all circumstances,
should logic and law be at swords’ point? One does not have to be
an Aristotelian to recognize the law of non-contradiction. This
principle states that it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be
17
at the same time and in the same respect. When it comes to the
personhood of the unborn, the law of logic is today sorely
challenged by the collision course of fetal rights laws and abortion
laws. These two areas of law seem to run on parallel tracks without
any connecting principles.
In her dissent to the 1982 Supreme Court case City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor famously predicted that Roe v. Wade was on a “collision
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 774–75.
13. Id. at 781–82.
14. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court exhibited “preternatural
solicitousness” for corporate well-being and callousness towards the investing
public in a securities law case).
15. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that Texas
criminal abortion statutes prohibiting abortion at any stage of the pregnancy,
except to save the mother’s life, are unconstitutional).
16. See id.
17. See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLE OF
CONTRADICTION 644 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 4
1. MAGNUSON-LEDERMAN - RC.DOC

770

4/10/2007 12:52:20 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

18

course with itself.”
Justice O’Connor was speaking, of course,
19
specifically about the trimester framework established by Roe. But
her comments have an even more salient application when viewed
in light of the developing law of “fetal rights.” Fetal rights laws
confer upon the unborn child the status of a human being who is
20
entitled to the normal protection of the law. In contrast, abortion
law relegates the status of the unborn to, at best, “potential human
21
life” in order to safeguard the privacy and interests of the mother.
How long can these contradictory ideas continue to coexist?
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FETAL RIGHTS LAWS
American law has for some time been moving in the direction
of recognizing unborn children as “persons.” Thirty-four of the
fifty states have statutes criminalizing the killing of an unborn child
22
outside the domain of now-legal abortions. While not all of these
18. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458
(1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
19. See id. at 458–59.
20. See infra Part II.A–C.
21. See generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (affirming, among
other things, that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting potential human
life, but found that interest subordinate to the privacy and safety of the mother).
22. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006) (establishing
that a fetus at any stage of development is a person for the purposes of state laws
dealing with murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and assault);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.150–.180, .280–.289 (2006) (criminalizing murder,
manslaughter, negligent homicide, and assault of an unborn child); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1102 to -1105 (2001 & Supp. 2006) (stating that an unborn child
at any stage of development is considered a person for purposes of the state’s
murder and manslaughter statutes); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(b)(i)(a) (2006)
(defining a person under Arkansas’s murder, manslaughter, and negligent
homicide laws to include unborn children of twelve weeks or greater gestation);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999) (defining murder as the killing of a human
being “or a fetus”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007)
(criminalizing the unlawful killing of an “unborn quick child” as murder in the
same degree had the crime been committed against the mother); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-5-28, -29, -80 (2003 & Supp. 2006) (criminalizing the acts of assault, battery,
and feticide of an unborn child at any stage of development); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 18-4001, -4006 (2004) (defining murder and manslaughter as including the
killing of a human embryo or fetus); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West
2002) (establishing, as a crime, the intentional homicide of an unborn child); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1, -3, -4 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (killing of a viable fetus is
murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v.
Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004) (ruling that a viable fetus is a “person” for
purposes of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (LexisNexis 1999), which criminalizes
murder of a “person”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5–.8 (1997 & Supp. 2007)
(establishing first-, second-, and third-degree feticide); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
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states provide complete protection for the unborn, all provide at
least some level of protection. For example, in California, the
23
death penalty may be imposed for the killing of a fetus.
The
California Supreme Court has ruled that “fetal viability is not a
required element” of fetal murder under the California statute
24
criminalizing such conduct. Pennsylvania law imposes the same
penalty for the murder of an unborn child as for the murder of any
25
other person —the only exception being that the death penalty

§ 2-103 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (stating that the term “person” includes a viable
fetus for purposes of criminal law); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571
(Mass. 1989) (holding that the killing of a viable unborn child is “murder” under
the common-law definition of the term); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.322–.323 (2004)
(MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.554–555 (2006)) (killing of a viable fetus is manslaughter);
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.266–.2691 (2006) (criminalizing murder and manslaughter of
an unborn child); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(d) (2006) (defining murder as
including the deliberate killing of an unborn child); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West
2000) (stating that an unborn child is a “person,” construed to apply to
manslaughter and murder statutes in State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1992)
and State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. App. 1997)); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28-391 to 28-3,101 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006) (criminalizing murder,
manslaughter, motor-vehicle homicide, and assault of an unborn child); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.210 (LexisNexis 2006) (imposing manslaughter for a person who
willfully kills an unborn quick child); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to 12.1-17.106 (1997) (criminalizing murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, and assault
of an unborn child); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01–.06 (West 2006) (applying
murder, manslaughter, and homicide statutes to the “unlawful termination of
another’s pregnancy”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 691 (West Supp. 2007) (stating
that definition of “human being” for purposes of homicide statute includes an
unborn child); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601–2609 (West 2006) (criminalizing
homicide, manslaughter, and assault of an unborn child); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5
(2002) (criminalizing the “willful killing of an unborn quick child” as
manslaughter); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (Supp. 2006) (making a separate
offense for the death or bodily injury of an unborn child); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-16-1.1 (2006) (criminalizing fetal homicide if the person knew or reasonably
should have known that the mother was pregnant); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107
(2006) (stating that a viable fetus is an “individual” for purposes of being a victim
under criminal law); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07, 19.01 (Vernon 2003 & Supp.
2006) (criminalizing the “death” of an “individual” and defining an unborn child
as an “individual” who dies if not born alive); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (2003)
(stating that criminal homicide includes causing the death of an unborn child at
any stage of its development); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (2004) (making a felony
of killing another’s fetus); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.32.060(1)(b) (West 2000)
(defining manslaughter as applying to killing of unborn quick child); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-2-30 (LexisNexis 2005) (recognizing an embryo or fetus as a victim for
criminal law); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.01–.02, 940.04–.06 (West 2005) (stating that
homicide and murder statutes apply to unborn children).
23. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 593 (Cal. 1994).
24. Id. at 594.
25. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a)(2) (West 2006).
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26

may not be imposed for the murder of an unborn child.
In
addition to imposing criminal penalties for killing an unborn child,
every state now provides civil remedies for intentionally or
27
negligently injured unborn children.
A. Fetal Rights in Tort Law—Wrongful Death and Injuries Caused by
Negligence
1.

Common Law and the “Born Alive” Rule

Among the first steps in recognizing fetal rights was to allow a
child who had been “born alive” to bring a civil action against a
party who had in some way injured the child before birth. Known
as the “Born Alive” Rule, this right was readily recognized at
28
common law and favorably spoken of by Sir William Blackstone,
Sir Edward Coke, and other prominent English jurists of the
29
seventeenth century. The “Born Alive” Rule allowed recovery only
in cases where a child had been born alive—it did not allow
30
recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus. This law was gradually
accepted in the United States until every jurisdiction allowed
31
recovery for prenatal injuries if the child was born alive. But this
development of the law did little to further the recognition of a
fetus as a “person” before birth.
Fetal rights were not materially furthered by this recognition,
arguably because it is only reasonable for a child who has suffered
prenatal injuries to have some legal recourse upon birth. Justice
26.
27.

See id.
See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 (W. Va. 1995) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 reporter’s note on subsec. (1) (1982);
KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 55 at 368 (5th ed. 1984)).
28. See Mary Lynn Kime, Note, Hughes v. State: The “Born Alive” Rule Dies a
Timely Death, 30 TULSA L.J. 539, 540–41 (1995) (explaining that “[b]y the
seventeenth century, the English common law fully embraced the ‘Born Alive’
Rule” which imposed civil liability for injury to a fetus so long as the child was born
alive).
29. Id. at 541–42 n.27 (citing SIR EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *50; SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *198).
30. See id. at 541 (explaining the rationale for the live-birth requirement—
specifically that the “primitive knowledge of human life in the womb” made it
difficult, if not impossible, “to establish that the child was alive in the womb at the
time of the defendant’s [wrongful] acts”).
31. Id. at 541–42. See Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 219–22 (Mich.
1971) (describing the historical timeline by which U.S. jurisdictions began
allowing recovery for prenatal injuries).
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32

McGuire confirmed this notion when he stated in Bonbrest v. Kotz
that “[i]f a child after birth has no right of action for prenatal
injuries, we have a wrong inflicted for which there is no
33
remedy . . . .” These questions naturally arise: If it inflicts a wrong
to injure a child prenatally, is it not the infliction of a greater
wrong to kill a child prenatally? And should there not be a remedy
for tortious conduct resulting in the death of the unborn child?
The next step logically was to allow recovery for wrongful death.
Accordingly, courts, such as those in Minnesota, began extending
fetal rights laws to provide protection for the unborn in cases
where the infant was not born alive.
2.

Minnesota Disregards the “Born Alive” Rule

In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Verkennes v.
34
Corniea, became the first to allow recovery under a wrongful death
35
theory for a stillborn child. Verkennes’s wife and child died as a
36
result of allegedly negligent hospital care. The child was not born
37
alive. A lower state court granted the defendant hospital’s motion
for a demurrer under the reasoning that the child decedent, whom
the plaintiff was claiming the wrongful death of, was never a person
38
in being.
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with this
reasoning and allowed the father to recover even though the child
39
had not been born alive. The court required that the child be
40
viable at the time the injuries were sustained.
The court
considered viability to be the point in time when the child was
41
capable of life independent of the mother.
32. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D.C. 1946). In this case, the court held that an infant,
through her father and next friend, had a right of action for injuries she suffered
as a result of allegedly being removed from her mother’s womb through
professional malpractice. Id. at 142–43.
33. Id. at 141 (quoting the Supreme Court of Canada in Montreal Tramways
v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337, 344–45).
34. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
35. See id. at 370–71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
36. Id. at 366–67, 38 N.W.2d at 839.
37. Id. at 366, 38 N.W.2d at 839.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 370–71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
40. See id. (concluding that where an unborn child is viable—having a
“capacity for a separate and independent existence”—but is later destroyed
through a wrongful act, then a cause of action under Minnesota’s wrongful-death
statute arises).
41. See id. at 368, 38 N.W.2d at 840 (quoting Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 56
N.E. 638, 641 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting)).
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Tort Recovery in Other States

In following years, courts were split as to whether a child had
to be born alive in order to recover damages in a civil action. The
Minnesota view was that a plaintiff could recover in a wrongful
42
death action in the case of a viable stillborn child, whereas courts
in other states, such as Indiana, held to the common-law “born
43
alive” rule.
But would courts take a third step? Would they grant civil
protection to a pre-viable fetus? In 1976, the Rhode Island
44
Supreme Court, in Presley v. Newport Hospital, stated that:
Reliance on the viability distinction has been spurned in
several cases concerning prenatal injuries to individuals
who survive birth and are forced to carry the scars of their
early injuries through life. A recent line of cases has cast
the viability distinction aside as an anomaly owing its
existence to long outmoded concepts of both science and
45
law.
The court went on to state that:
Simple precepts of logic have carried this small area of the
law to a point far removed from the position adopted by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Northampton . . . . The
momentum of that logic together with our previous
holding in Sylvia carry us now to the inescapable
conclusion that viability is a concept bearing no relation
to the attempts of the law to provide remedies for civil
wrongs. If we profess allegiance to reason, it would be
seditious to adopt so arbitrary and uncertain a concept as
viability as a dividing line between those persons who shall
enjoy the protection of our remedial laws and those who
shall become, for most intents and purposes, nonentities.
It seems that if live birth is to be characterized, as it so
frequently has been, as an arbitrary line of demarcation,
then viability when enlisted to serve the same purpose, is a

42. See id. at 370–71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
43. See, e.g., Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind. 2002) (requiring a
child to be “born alive” for purposes of state’s wrongful death statute); Cowe by
Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 636–37 (Ind. 1991) (quoting the
“born alive” rule found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979) with
approval). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-14 (West 2004) (defining “human
being” as an individual who has been “born and is alive”).
44. 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976).
45. Id. at 752.
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46

veritable non sequitur.
Viability as the borderline of personhood had collided with logic
and logic was deemed the winner. But logic’s victory was both
partial and temporary. Presley came to represent only a small
minority of the courts and was later rejected, as dictum, in Miccolis
47
Gradually, however, the shift
v. AMICA Mutual Insurance Co.
toward full recognition of fetal rights continued.
With regard to the current status of wrongful death law as it
pertains to the fetus, the Arkansas Supreme Court recently stated in
48
Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n:
Thirty-two jurisdictions permit a wrongful-death action on
behalf of a viable fetus. (Of those thirty-two jurisdictions,
four permit an action for an unviable fetus (Connecticut,
Missouri, South Dakota, and West Virginia)). Four
jurisdictions permit an action, even for unviable fetuses,
but have a live birth or stillbirth requirement (Louisiana,
Maryland, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania).
One
jurisdiction permits an alternative remedy by allowing an
action for damages resulting in stillbirth caused by
negligence (Florida). One jurisdiction noted in dicta that
a wrongful-death action might be permitted but declined
to reach the merits on procedural grounds (Utah). Three
jurisdictions prohibit an action for an unborn nonviable
fetus but have not reached the issue of whether a viable
fetus may maintain an action (Alaska, Oregon, and Rhode
Island). Four jurisdictions have no case law on the issue
(Colorado, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Wyoming). Only
nine jurisdictions, including Arkansas, reject a wrongful49
death action for a viable fetus.
In Jefferson Hospital, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed its
50
Accordingly, Arkansas no
prior position on the viability issue.
51
longer rejects wrongful death actions for a viable fetus.

46. Id. at 753.
47. 587 A.2d 67, 70 (R.I. 1991) (contending that Presley dealt solely with a fullterm viable fetus and therefore “the philosophic analysis engaged in by the
plurality was merely dictum, however scholarly and comprehensive may have been
the terms in which it was presented”).
48. 42 S.W.3d 508 (Ark. 2001).
49. Id. at 515 n.2.
50. Id. at 516–18 (overruling Chatelain v. Kelley, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995) after
the Arkansas legislature amended the definition of “person” in its criminal code to
afford protection to unborn viable fetuses).
51. See id. at 517–18.
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52

The “allegiance to reason” alluded to in Presley should render
irreconcilable this growing recognition of fetal rights in tort law
with the constitutional right of abortion recognized in Roe v.
53
Wade. When is the act of intentionally causing the death of a
viable or non-viable fetus “wrongful”? Since the Supreme Court
has held that a woman has a constitutional right to have an
abortion, jurisdictions allowing for recovery in cases involving the
wrongful death of a fetus must make an exception for legalized
abortion. A wrongful death action may not be brought where the
person who caused the death of the fetus was a doctor acting at the
behest of the mother. But if jurisdictions recognize the reality of
prenatal death, does that not imply prenatal life? And if that “life”
has a right independent of its mother, does not abortion itself
bring death, even if not legally wrongful?
The way out of this dilemma typically chosen by the courts is to
shift the focus to consent. A legal abortion is done with the
consent of the mother; in a wrongful death or personal injury
action on behalf of a fetus, the mother has not consented to the
54
death of the fetus. Although the absence of the mother’s consent
seems to be the deciding factor at the moment in deciding whether
the destruction of the unborn child is lawful or not, it is not, on its
face, an entirely satisfying solution. If tort law recognizes preborn
life and a preborn right to live independent of the mother, why
should there be no consideration of these “rights” when they
collide with the intentional decision of the mother to destroy that
life?
B. Fetal Rights in Criminal Law—Fetal Homicide
1.

Common Law

In the same way that tort law, given the “momentum of logic”

52. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 754 (R.I. 1976).
53. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
54. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994); People v. Ford, 581
N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321–22
(Minn. 1990). See also Cari L. Leventhal, Comment, The Crimes Against the Unborn
Child Act: Recognizing Potential Human Life in Pennsylvania Criminal Law, 103 DICK.
L. REV. 173, 197 (1998) (distinguishing Roe v. Wade from fetal homicide legislation
on the grounds that the latter purports to criminalize the killing of a fetus without
the mother’s consent, whereas the Roe decision “does not protect, much less
bestow on an assailant, the right to destroy a fetus”).
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55

referred to in Presley, has been marching inexorably in the
direction of recognizing the rights of a fetus, criminal law has also
been making strides in the same direction. The criminal law, at
least in recent years, has been moving briskly toward the
recognition of the personhood of the unborn. States have enacted
legislation that imposes harsh penalties for the killing of an unborn
56
child. This was, of course, not always the case.
Crimes involving murder, or “homicide,” were originally part
57
of the common law. The common law treatment of a fetus is still
referenced today as a guide for how statutes based on and
58
incorporating common-law crimes should be understood.
Discussion of the criminal killing of a fetus at common law is
inextricably linked to the history of abortion because both relate to
the termination of a pregnancy.
The primary common-law authorities on the criminal
treatment of the fetus are Bracton, Coke, and Blackstone.
Bracton’s statement on the subject early in the thirteenth century
in his Laws and Customs of England is usually taken as a starting
point. Bracton indicates that the concept of quickening affected
the determination of fetal homicide: “If there be some one, who
has struck a pregnant woman, or has given her poison, whereby he
has caused an abortion, if the foetus be already formed and
animated, and particularly if it be animated, he commits
59
homicide.” Blackstone agreed that “quickening” was a necessary
element of any killing of an unborn child, and stated:
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by
nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation
of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother’s
womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion
or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if anyone beat her,
whereby the child dieth, in her body, and she is delivered
of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the
55. Presley, 365 A.2d at 753.
56. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
57. See Keeler v. Super. Ct. of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 620–22 (Cal.
1970) (reviewing the historical origins and development of common-law
“abortional homicide”).
58. See, e.g., Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Ark. 1987); State v.
Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156, 158–59 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Larkin v. Cahalan,
208 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Mich. 1973); State v. Loomis, 97 A. 896, 896–97 (N.J. 1916).
59. See Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826, 828 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
(quoting 2 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 279 (Twiss ed.
1879)).
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ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But the modern
law doth not look upon this offence in quite so atrocious a
60
light, but merely as a heinous misdemeanor.
Coke concurred with Blackstone:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by potion or
otherwise killeth it in her wombe; or if a man beat her,
whereby the childe dieth in her body, and she is delivered
of a dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no murder:
but if the childe be born alive, and dieth of the potion,
battery, or other cause, this is murder: for in law it is
accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it
61
is born alive.
Simply stated, at common law, the killing of an unborn child
was not a murder. The common law considered such a killing to
be a lesser crime. And while the common law did recognize that
the killing of an unborn child was wrong, in the eyes of the
criminal law, a fetus was not afforded the rights of a child that had
been born alive.
The controversy about criminalizing the taking of viable fetal
life has been long and contentious. Coke’s view—that an unborn
child cannot be the victim of a murder since it is not yet a person in
being—still has its adherents. Others continue to contend that if a
child were to be killed while yet unborn, the perpetrator should be
punished as though he had murdered an adult. The decisions of
courts have reflected this disagreement, using various rationales to
62
support their positions. While some courts have ruled that one
who kills an unborn child must be punished to the full extent of
63
the law as if they had killed an adult, other courts have disagreed.
60. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*129–30.
61. SIR EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *50.
62. See People v. Dennis, 950 P.2d 1035 (Cal. 1998) (finding that where
defendant killed his former wife and her unborn child, the fetal homicide was
included under California Penal Code section 190.2(a)(3), which provides that a
person may be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole or death
if convicted of more than one murder); People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (upholding an Illinois Statute that imposes a penalty for the intentional
homicide of an unborn child which is the same as the penalty for first degree
murder, except that the death penalty may not be imposed; the defendant was
sentenced to twenty years in prison for the intentional homicide of a fetus);
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (upholding
sentence of lower court where defendant killed his girlfriend and her unborn
child, even though sentence was greater for the murder of the mother than it was
for the murder of the child).
63. See cases cited supra note 62.
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State Unborn Victims of Violence Acts

It has not been until recently that state legislatures have
enacted laws that give the same criminal-law protection to a fetus as
to a child who has been born alive. Thirty-four states now have
fetal homicide laws that provide at least some level of criminal law
64
protection for the unborn. Of these thirty-four states, twenty-four
65
have laws that protect the fetus from conception until birth. To
give some examples:
Alabama
On July 1, 2006, the Alabama legislature amended the Code of
Alabama to include as a “person” or “human being,” “an unborn
66
child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability.”
An unborn child is to be so considered for purposes of the state
laws dealing with murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent
67
homicide, and assault.
Arizona
Arizona’s murder and manslaughter statutes apply fully to any
68
“unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development.” For
purposes of establishing the level of punishment for violent crime,
a victim who is “an unborn child shall be treated like a minor who
69
is under twelve years of age.”
Minnesota
Since 1968, Minnesota has considered the killing of an unborn
child at any stage of development to be murder (first-, second-, or
70
third-degree), or manslaughter (first- or second-degree).
Minnesota has also established a felony murder rule, making it a
felony to cause the death of an unborn child during the
71
commission of a felony.
Additionally, causing the death of an
unborn child through the operation of a motor vehicle is criminal
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006).
See id.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1102 to -1105 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
See id. § 13-604.01(L).
See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.2661–.2665 (2006).
See id. §§ 609.2662, .268.
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72

Ohio
If an unborn child is killed at any stage of prenatal
development, it is aggravated murder, murder, voluntary
manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, negligent homicide,
73
aggravated vehicular homicide, or vehicular homicide.
The legislation adopted by these four states is representative of
74
legislation that has been enacted in twenty-four states. Whatever
the distinctions in these criminal law regimes, they all share a
necessary premise: in the eyes of the criminal law, an unborn child
is a person no different from a fully grown, fully developed human
being. Indeed, the penalties that these states impose upon those
who kill an unborn child are the same as the penalties imposed
75
upon one who would kill an adult, with one typical exception.
Most states do not allow the death penalty to be imposed for the
76
killing of an unborn child.
C. Fetal Rights in Criminal Law—Federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act
The Unborn Victims of Violence statutes enacted in various
states are simply reflective of the Federal Unborn Victims of
77
Violence Act passed in April of 2004. This law, commonly known
78
as “Laci and Connor’s Law,” was named after a 2003 case in which
Scott Peterson was convicted of killing his then-pregnant wife, Laci

72. See id. § 609.21, subdiv. 3.
73. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01–.07 (West 2006).
74. See Leventhal, supra note 54, at 177–79.
75. See sources cited supra note 22 and accompanying text (listing states
which apply murder and manslaughter statutes to persons who cause the death of
an unborn child).
76. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(c)–(e) (2003 & Supp. 2006); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2(d) (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.060
(LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6(B) (1997 & Supp.
2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.210 (LexisNexis 2006); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a)(2)
(West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5(a) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-1083(A)(2)(d) (Supp. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1.1 (2006); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (2004).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (Supp. IV 2004).
78. President Bush Signs Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040401-3.html.
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Peterson. Laci mysteriously disappeared on Christmas Eve, 2002.
At the time she went missing, Laci was eight months pregnant with
81
the child that she and Scott planned to name Connor. A jury
found that Peterson killed his wife and their unborn child and
82
threw their bodies into the ocean. Peterson was convicted not
only of the murder of his wife, but also of the murder of their
83
unborn child. Peterson was eventually sentenced to death for the
84
crime.
The Federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act was passed by
Congress and signed into law by the President partially in response
85
to the Peterson case.
The Act recognizes unborn children as
victims when they are injured or killed during the commission of a
86
federal or military crime. The Act provides in part:
(a)(1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of
the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby
causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section
1365) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct
takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this
section.
(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph,
the punishment for that separate offense is the same as
the punishment provided under Federal law for that
conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn
87
child’s mother.
This statute again has a stubborn premise. In the eyes of
federal criminal or military law, an unborn child, at least in some
circumstances, can be considered a victim of a crime deserving of
88
the same protection as is afforded to the mother. Again, the only
real distinction is that the death penalty may not be imposed for
79. Peterson Guilty of Murder, CNN.COM, Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/
2004/LAW/11/12/peterson.verdict/index.html.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Peterson Sentenced to Death for Wife’s Slaying, CNN.COM, Mar. 15, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/16/peterson.case/index.html.
85. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Washington Talk; From CNN to Congress, Legislation
by Anecdote, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at A26. The legislation was pending in
Congress for four years, but gained significant support after the Peterson case. Id.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (Supp. IV 2004).
87. Id. § (a)(1)–(2)(A).
88. Id. § (a)(2)(A).
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89

the killing of an unborn child under this Act. In defining the
phrase “unborn child” the statute states:
As used in this section, the term ‘unborn child’ means a
child in utero, and the term ‘child in utero’ or ‘child, who
is in utero’ means a member of the species homo sapiens,
90
at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.
This language is very similar to that which is found in many of
the Unborn Victims of Violence Acts that have been adopted by the
91
states. It should be noted that the federal act also contains an
92
“except in cases of legal abortion” provision.
There has been much debate as to whether statutes that
criminalize the killing of unborn children will in some way infringe
upon the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion. Those
who consider themselves to be “pro-choice” generally oppose the
93
passage of such laws.
This opposition is based on the quite
understandable belief that the granting of rights to the fetus,
independent of rights granted to the mother, is a “slippery slope
94
strategy” to restricting abortion choice. One such “pro-choice”
group has stated:
[Unborn Victims of Violence Acts] would give separate
legal status to any fertilized egg, embryo, or fetus, even if
the woman is unaware that she is pregnant. Feminists
argue that the House’s passage of [the Federal Unborn
Victims of Violence Act] was not meant to protect women,
that instead it was meant to lay the groundwork for
dismantling Roe v. Wade by giving the fetus rights separate
95
from the mother.
The logic of this view is unassailable. For those who believe that a
89. Id. § (a)(2)(D).
90. See id. § (d).
91. Statutes with language similar to that used in the Federal Unborn Victims
of Violence Act defining an “unborn child” include: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1105(C) (2001 & Supp. 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37(1) (2006); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(B)(1) (West 2006).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (Supp. IV 2004).
93. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights: A
Look at Fetal Protection Statutes and Wrongful Death Actions on Behalf of Fetuses,
ACLU.COM, July 31, 1996, http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/fetalrights/
16530res19960731.html.
94. See Rick Montgomery, Fetal Rights Going Too Far?, THE NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh-Durham, N.C.), July 10, 2006, http://www.newsobserver.com/114/story/
459068.html.
95. Rebecca Farmer, Fetal Rights’ Initiatives Concern Abortion Rights Supporters,
NATIONAL NOW TIMES, Fall 2001, http://www.now.org/nnt/fall-2001/fetalrights.
html.
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woman has an absolute right to abort, the provisions of laws that
recognize the rights of the fetus threaten a collision course. Are
not the premises of the two right-creating regimes irreconcilable?
Here, as elsewhere, the courts have once again generally
resorted to the consent of the mother as the distinguishing factor
between legalized abortion and the offenses that these statutes
96
criminalize. The courts reason that since the child is still a part of
the mother’s body, if the mother gives her consent there is no
crime in bringing about the death of the unborn child through
97
legalized abortion. Put more bluntly, the child has a right to life
against everyone in the world except its mother. The only person
who may, with the law’s blessing, end the life of the unborn child is
the child’s mother.
D. Other Developing Areas of Fetal Rights
The principal fetal rights developments outlined above have
been accompanied by other examples of the growing recognition
of fetal rights. For example, recent cases have extended fetal rights
to areas never considered in the common law, and track more
closely with the reasoning of the Arkansas lower court that placed
an unborn child in protective custody. Judges have required
specific actions of expectant mothers in the interests of their
98
unborn children, such as ordering cesarean sections, detaining
99
expectant mothers who use illegal drugs, and even charging
expectant mothers who use illegal drugs with supplying drugs to
100
minors.
The special significance of these developments is that
they are explicitly directed to resolving conflicts between the
mother and her unborn child. Here, the collision of premises is
direct and unavoidable. A mother’s intentions are disregarded
when they threaten the legitimate interests of the child in her
womb. The interference with the mother’s prerogatives has gone
to the most basic of her rights, the right to liberty—including
possible imprisonment—to ensure that her unborn child receives
adequate prenatal protection.
For example, in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital
96. See sources cited supra note 54 and accompanying text.
97. See sources cited supra note 54 and accompanying text.
98. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E. 2d 457, 459
(Ga. 1981).
99. See Arkansas v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772, 773 (Ark. 2003).
100. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778–79 (S.C. 1997).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 4
1. MAGNUSON-LEDERMAN - RC.DOC

784

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

4/10/2007 12:52:20 PM

[Vol. 33:3

Authority, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s ruling
requiring an expectant mother to have a cesarean section
101
delivery.
The doctors at Griffin Spalding County Hospital
102
determined that the mother had complete placenta previa.
The
doctors further determined that if a natural birth was attempted,
there was a 99% chance that the child would die and only a 50%
103
chance that the mother would survive the ordeal. The expectant
parents, because of religious beliefs, refused to consent to a
104
cesarean section.
The hospital then sought an injunction
ordering the mother to give birth via cesarean section in order to
105
The lower court, in issuing an
preserve the life of the child.
order to authorize the cesarean section, stated:
Because the life of defendant and of the unborn are, at
the moment inseparable, the Court deems it appropriate
to infringe upon the wishes of the mother to the extent it
is necessary to give the child an opportunity to live.
Accordingly, the plaintiff hospitals are hereby authorized
to administer to defendant all medical procedures
deemed necessary by the attending physician to preserve
106
the life of defendant’s unborn child.
In this case, the court was willing to “infringe upon the wishes
of the mother” in order to give the unborn child an opportunity to
107
live. It should be noted that this case was decided in 1981, when
108
it was illegal in the state of Georgia to abort a viable fetus.
In an analogous example that occurred in 2004, Melissa Ann
Rowland was charged with murder for delaying a cesarean section
109
that could have saved the life of one of her twins.
Ms. Rowland
was ultimately convicted of child endangerment and sentenced to
eighteen months probation after the defense showed at trial that

101. 274 S.E.2d at 460.
102. Id. at 458. A placenta previa occurs when the placenta becomes
positioned between the baby and the birth canal. See id. In this particular case, it
was virtually impossible for the complete placenta previa to correct itself prior to
delivery. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Utah C-Section Mom Gets Probation (CBS News broadcast, April 19, 2004)
(transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/12/national/
main605537.shtml).
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110

she had a “mental illness.” The murder charge that Ms. Rowland
originally faced is freighted with irony. Ms. Rowland had no right
to choose to expose her fetus to the risk of natural birth. That was
a crime. But she could have, at any time during her pregnancy,
asked for and received a legal abortion. That would not have been
a crime; instead, that would have been a constitutional right. Since
she did not ask for an abortion, she was faced with a murder charge
when she did not have a timely cesarean section in order to save
the life of one of her children. To the baby in her womb, it is
tempting to say that it is a distinction without a difference.
III. CONCLUSION—THE COLLISION OF LOGIC
The laws of logic are absolute. They are the rules of thought
itself. But premises are not absolute. They may be in error, may be
subjective, and may be the subject of controversy. But once the
premises are established, the law of logic is sure and inexorable.
The continuing affirmation of an absolute right to abortion—and
its corollary, the lack of any rights afforded to the fetus in the
womb—and the accelerating of protections for the rights of the
unborn, even against its mother, appear to be based on premises
that are irreconcilable. The “collision” which Justice O’Connor
111
alluded to is imminent and unavoidable. Put simply, the laws and
court decisions granting rights to the unborn and those upholding
the constitutional right to abortion conflict with each other and the
law of non-contradiction. Almost every state allows for “abortion
on demand” and there are, practically speaking, few restrictions on
112
a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.
In order to justify
legalized abortion, it must be argued that the aborted fetus has not
113
yet attained legal “personhood.”
Indeed, it has no rights
independent of its mother for protection from the intentional act
of ending its life when that decision is made by the mother. But it
may be held to have rights superior to its mother when its health is
114
threatened.
The law of non-contradiction establishes that it is impossible
110. Id.
111. See supra Part I.
112. See generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1012 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the Court’s holding imposes “unfettered abortion on
demand”).
113. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973) (addressing whether a fetus
is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
114. See supra Part II.D.
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for a thing to be and not to be at the same time and in the same
115
respect. It should then be true that an unborn child cannot be a
person and a non-person at the same time and in the same respect.
The solutions proposed by scholastic reasoning in these cases come
down to the most fundamental of logical fallacies: the “ipse dixit
fallacy.” This fallacy states that a proposition is true simply because
someone says it is, and is little short of a naked appeal to
116
authority.
Exasperated parents may resort to this. “Because I
said so” ends the argument. But it is an unsatisfactory long-term
solution for parent-child interaction.
And it is more than
unsatisfactory as a foundation for the law. The reason that a fetus
is a being and a non-being, has a right to life and does not have a
right to life, has rights against its mother and has no rights against
its mother is ultimately because the law says so—nothing more.
Does not an “allegiance to reason,” with its recognition of “the
momentum of logic,” suggest that this continuing contradiction be
rethought in current law?

115. See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 17, at 644.
116. Ipse dixit: Something asserted but not proved. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
847 (8th ed. 2004).
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